

TRADITIONAL PROCESSES OF POWER IN SOUTH INDIA : AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF LOCAL INFLUENCE*

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Normally, in the West, a concentration of political power into one control system has been distinguished from the administrative apparatus through which that power was exercised. This has been especially apparent in modern and more than nominally democratic and constitutional systems, wherein power components have been elaborately organized and equipped with corrective checks, functional channels, and legitimizing symbols to prevent breakdown or misgovernment. Such neat distinctions are more difficult to apply to political institutions which existed in pre-modern India.¹

Few dissent from the general view that political behaviour within the social order of pre-modern India was by tradition primarily administrative in character, both as to its structure and its functions. By this we mean that political energies, which were motivated by acquisitive and predatory aspirations of various elite groups competing for advantage within a highly complex and communally segmented social structure, found expression in the elements and operations of military and financial organization. In short, a power system could expand and prosper only by employing its forces in warlike actions (and in diplomacy based upon its war potential); moreover, that system could nourish itself only by efficiently extracting revenue. Essentially administrative functions were involved; and these functions of control were hierarchically and territorially interlocked with the variable intricacies of the social order.

It is not enough, therefore, simply to trace the rise and fall of dynastic kingdoms and principalities in terms of their military prowess, ascendancy, or decline. What is required is a more fundamental appreciation of internal structures and changing interrelations between socio-political entities within a far wider mosaic of

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potentially dysfunctional or eufunctional parts (or of mechanisms of parts within parts). Such an appreciation of intrinsically administrative processes demands more than two-dimensional studies of superficial breadth and chronological length. Historical light must be thrown deeper into local affairs, illuminating the springs from which traditional influences have flowed.

For this reason, one area of South India has been selected and the development of local influences within it studied intensively. A comparative analysis of the history of Guntur District² under the rule of Company Bahadur with reference to other localities, other times, and other regimes should provide grounds for generalization upon the strength of localizing tendencies and traditions.

I

There is evidence to show that certain local elite groups and institutions of the Krishna-Godavari Deltas have survived the intrusions of exogenous forces through many centuries. While leading warrior castes can be traced into the mists of antiquity, these communities did not leave many records concerning their early history. As might be expected, those who did leave clear records of the past were the literate castes; and, quite naturally, those castes which carried on these written records made claims of their own preponderant influence in local affairs. Without a doubt, the oldest seats of continuous local leadership about which we can have some certainty were those of the *Karnams* or Village Accountants.

The possibility that *Karnams* may originally have been appointed as local representatives of extra-village power, although this cannot automatically be presumed, does not minimize their potential for exercising local influence. Indeed, the enduring strength of these remarkable leaders arose out of their control of all the bookwork necessary for administering village finances and for rendering any demands imposed by forces outside the village. *Karnams* prepared and preserved financial accounts. They signed and registered receipts; they inscribed official letters and documents; they announced orders and decrees; and they recorded village expenditures for superior systems of power, if necessary. To a large degree, if village government had evidences of continuity productivity or of past productivity, these were due to the persons who preserved that knowledge. It was very difficult for any exogenous, centralized system of power (e. g. some form of state) to extract revenues sufficient to maintain power enough to control villages, much less to wage war, without cooperation from *Karnams*. Because of this, it became the object of every strongly

centralized dynastic power to bring these local functionaries tightly under control.

Understandably, local positions became focal points for controversy, manipulation, and patronage. But the skills and techniques of local, administrative scribes were closely guarded sacred-secrets, often the strictly preserved monopoly of one family or caste in each village. Family or caste combinations, however, could be developed and networks of influence extended over wider localities. Such combinations could sometimes become increasingly sophisticated and organized strongly enough to resist, to corrupt and infiltrate, and finally to permeate and undermine progressively higher levels and wider areas of political and administrative authority. Such combinations could be very difficult to discover, much less control. Violence was no answer. A few Karnams might be eliminated or replaced. One or two villages might be crushed. Yet the functions of Karnams were altogether too valuable and their skills too rare. Drastic, wholesale eradication was not feasible unless large groups of dependable replacements were available. But, even when systematic substitutions from the top of an administrative hierarchy downward were made, there was usually and eventually a silent recurrence of combining local influences to the corrupting of central power.

The earliest Karnams, of which we know, were Aravas (Goldsmiths), Buddhists and Jains. The resurgence of medieval Hinduism brought about repeated efforts to displace these groups. Successive kingdoms sought to introduce small groups of military and financial officers into the administrative hierarchies and areas under their control. Family elements of these loyal groups would be given dominant positions in carefully selected and strategically important villages. On successive occasions under different regimes, therefore, we know that Benares Brahmans, Hoysala Brahmans, Patrulu Brahmans, Badagal Brahmans, Nandavarika (or Yagnavalkya) Brahmans, (Ayyar or Iengar) Tamil Brahmans, Kanakapillais, Lingayats, Linga or Gazulu Balijas, and Kayasthas, were introduced into various positions of administrative power within Guntur District, or Kondavidu Sima as it was known in pre-Muslim times. But since these groups were numerically small, they retained only isolated pockets of influence in widely scattered villages once their dynastic regimes were superseded.³

The most significant Brahman group to grow strong in Telugu country have been the Niyogis. There are various legends about how this administrative elite originated and how it became predominant in Karnamships. Undoubtedly, Niyogis were locally influential by the middle of the 12th century; moreover, despite many stories about the *Aruvelu-Niyogilu* and *Murduvelu-Niyogilu* ("6000 Niyogis" and "3000

Niyogis’), it is doubtful whether either Brahminical or Niyogi power triumphed very suddenly.⁴ The last Kakatiya king of Warangal is reported to have “crushed Jains in oil mills” and the Reddi kings of Kondavidu also dealt harshly with non-Hindu groups. Not until Vijayangara power extended across in the peninsula in the early 16th century did Niyogis reach their greatest power.⁵

It is necessary at this point to consider how local systems of power were structured, both as to military and revenue functions, at the village level and at extra-village levels of power. Functionally, as has already been indicated, some leadership communities specialized in skills of the pen. Hierarchically and geographically, depending upon the strength and sophistication of exogenous organizations of power above and beyond the limits of village systems of power, there usually would be different but socially homogenous communities performing military and clerical functions on behalf of those extended families which represented or collectively embodied a supreme regal or imperial authority.

It would be erroneous to suppose that all village systems of power were alike. As clusters of human settlement, villages represented no flat uniformity of economic or cultural achievement nor of any social or demographic distribution.⁶ Some villages were very large while others, very small. Some villages were very old while others were newly born. Some were very rich, powerful, and domineering while others were mere abjectly subservient hamlets (*pallems*) tottering on the brink of extinction. Market conditions, wealth and productivity differentials, socio-political, cultural or religious attractions, and plain geographic (if not climatic) conveniences made village influence highly unequal. For example, certain deltaic and coastal villages depended entirely upon maritime trade, overland traffic, salt productions, fishing, textile weaving, stone working, metal smelting, rice cultivation, or garden crops, to name just a few instances. Other villages were entirely parasitic or enjoyed special privileges, such as *agraharams*, *devasthanams*, *samasthanams* or various other kinds of *inams* (*maniams*, *savarams*, or *shrotriams*) which might be controlled by local elite communities or granted by fiat from some extra-local power. Likewise, in various villages, different local Brahman castes (chiefly Niyogis) tended to monopolize positions requiring clerical skill while local warrior castes such as Rajus, Kammas, Velamas, Kapus, and Telagas dominated military occupations. Below these castes were ranged the trading, artisan, and lesser cultivating castes. More than a score of castes were to be found at the bottom of the social order. The lowest of the low who loathed each other were the Madigas and Malas. Outside necessary economic or patrimonial

relationships, communities shunned contact with each other, each often cordially despising the rest. Rituals, marriage, eating, dress, conversation and other social actions were closely circumscribed by family, gotram, subcaste, and caste rules.⁷

Thus, it is understandable that there were concentric circles of exceedingly complicated competition between elite groups possessing the specialized skills indicated above, between sword-holders and pen-holders at each level and in each area, to say nothing of the larger, extra-village or territorial arenas of political competition. Larger and more sophisticated systems of territorial power developed out of these arenas of competition.

II

The consolidation and rise of the last and perhaps the greatest Hindu system of dynastic power was that which centered in Vijayanagara. This particular concentration of power originated in certain warrior and clerical families of Telugu-Kannada areas, most notably the Reddis and Niyogis. In the wake of Muslim provocations culminating in the incursion of Muhammad Tughluq, there followed a furious bubbling of local power which erupted and spewed tidal waves of regal and then of imperial power across South India. These tides carried Telugu warrior and clerical communities with them, first for extension of power and then for administration; moreover, when these tides finally began to recede, more than two centuries later (after the battle of Talikota in 1565), they left a residue in the form of small, widely scattered social enclaves extending across the land to the very periphery of the tidal expansion. As Vijayanagara power crumbled, the *Nayaks* of Tanjore, Mysore, Madura, and Ramnad and the *Poliyagars* of Anantapur, Cuddapah, and Salem were but a few of the many warrior families which vainly tried to assume high titles and dignities and to retain ever larger revenues and powers. Likewise also, Niyogi families of former generals, ministers, and lesser officers stubbornly clung to steadily dwindling resources and many managed to preserve local strong-holds of power in scattered villages of the south.⁸

Perhaps the next really significant and immediately premodern rise of locally originated, socio-political forces was that of the Marathas. The spread of Maratha influence can conveniently be seen as having occurred in three successive waves: initially, in service to the Deccani Sultanates; then, in bids for regal and imperial hegemony; and finally, in service to the British Company. Ultimately, this movement of social forces was altogether too diffused

and decentralized in origin to achieve political hegemony. Lacking in dynastic centrality and control, Maratha groups were, on the whole, more successful as servants than as masters; moreover, it is in their role as servants that they are of particular interest here.

The very origins of Bahmani power appear to have been linked with support from local, Deccani leadership. Maratha officers and soldiers contributed substantially to the military strength of the kingdom. Revenue management remained in local hands and was conducted in vernacular languages. There is reason to believe that Mahmud Gawan's greatness as an administrator was due to his sagacious employment of groups of Maratha Brahmans who were known as Desasthas. The breakup of Bahmani authority following the senseless execution of this able *Diwan* in 1481 led to increasing dependence upon the services of these Desasthas by the Sultans of Bijapur, Golkonda, and Ahmednagar. Then, as Muslim power expanded southward over the remains of Vijayanagar principalities in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, this ascendancy brought predictable changes in administrative personnel, changes which were very beneficial for Maratha Brahmans.⁹

On the south bank of the Krishna, the name of the present Guntur District was changed from Kondavidu Sima to Murtazanagar Circar. Desastha (Maratha Brahman) families and families of Golkonda Vyaparis, to whom they were related, were put in control of the financial administration of the area. Niyogis and Velamas were very harshly treated—many being put to the sword—and Kammas were raised to higher military positions in the district.¹⁰

But as the hegemony of the Qutb Shahis of Golkonda weakened during the century of their ostensible sway, local combinations of power in Guntur became more and more strong. Since political selection was rooted in caste and nourished by nepotism (through kinship), these local combinations silently gained inner and decentralized control, finding nourishment within the state structure without disturbing or causing the collapse of that structure. Khasa Raya Rao retained financial control of the district while his Muslim co-rulers were repeatedly replaced. Neither Raya Rao nor his Desastha successors moved to halt increasing incursions by Mughals and Marathas. Golkonda's power gradually vanished and local autonomy became virtually complete.¹¹ The Brahman ministers of the last Golkonda king, Akanna and Madanna Pantulu, "governed by means of the inhabitants of the country."¹² This mild and orderly rule by local Brahmans, while smacking of heresy to Sunni fanatics, inspired folklore, songs and legends which still survive.¹³

The houses of Timur and Asaf Jah did not do better in Guntur than the House of Qutb Shah had done. During 65 years, from 1687 to 1752, forty-two Muslim officers (hakims) were appointed to Murtazanagar.¹⁴ But, while these Amildars (Collectors) gave themselves to the entertainments, wars, and intrigues of Hyderabad, James Grant concludes that :

A certain class of Hindus . . . relieved their ignorant voluptuous Mussalman rulers from the intricate details of internal police and the management of mofussil collections.¹⁵

The ancient administrative machinery of the district, "merely an extension of village institutions in circles of villages",¹⁶ remained largely undisturbed. Only the district administrative titles changed, *Desmukh* (Executive), *Despandi* (Accountant-Registrar), and *Mannavar* (Head of Police) being Marathi and *Mazmudar* (Auditor) and *Sarrishtadar* (Chief Secretary) being Persian in origin.

III

These hereditary district officers, acting as buffers between local inhabitants and foreign intruders and as cementing agents between opposed cultures, religions, customs, and languages, were at the time indiscriminately labelled and perhaps mislabelled *Zamindars* by Hyderabad officials.¹⁷ The semi-feudal chieftains and ancient Gajapati lords of Ganjam and Vizagapatam, the appointed Desasthas, Kammas, and other elites of the Godavari-Krishna Doab, the Poliyagars and other robber chiefs of the Carnatic, and the Nayaks of the south all came under this common label. Nevertheless, although these *Zamindars* possessed distinct functions and powers and although, in Guntur, each was chosen from a different caste—the sword-holders being Kammas, Telegas, and Velamas while the pen-holders were Dasasthas¹⁸—the Hyderabad regime failed to prevent the silent combination of local power systems in its districts. In the words of Walter Elliot :

. . . a continual struggle was carried on between the *Sir Subah* and the Hyderabad Sirkar on one hand, and the *Sir Subah* and the *Zemindars* on the other: while these had a similar game to play with village officers and Ryots. The whole gave rise to a general system of evasion and deceit.¹⁹

As Hyderabad power relaxed, *Zamindari* power grew stronger.

But, while they walked like gods upon the earth, playing off Mughal, Maratha, British, and French power to greatest advantage, the *Zamindars* themselves in turn fell prey to the same inner pressures,

which were besetting Hyderabad, and were themselves devoured by corrosive influences arising out of the villages. In their little "states," they isolated themselves by mutual distrust; they cut themselves off from the assistance which a superior system of power might have afforded; and they lost the support of their own servants in turn. Being propped up later by the British merely prolonged the collapse of institutions which were already dead husks, monuments of defunct power systems.

The Great Vasireddy, Venkatadri Naidu, was the last great Zamindar of Guntur. In collusion with local leaders, he deceived the British as to the real resources of over five hundred villages under his authority. He scrupulously paid his tribute to the British. He kept a retinue of several thousand men, 300 horses, 80 elephants, 50 camels and uncounted bullock carts. The magnificence of his palaces at Amaravati, Chebrolu, and Chintapalli, and his town-house in Guntur became subjects of folklore. He built temples and repaired the lofty *gopuram* (temple gate) at Mangalagiri. Over a 100 richly gilt brass pillars, 30 feet high, were erected in his name at various shrines. Daily he fed hundreds of *purohits* (priests) and employed them to pray for him day and night. Often he distributed shawls, gold, and jewels among learned sadhus. The sums he spent on festivals, sacrifices, fire offerings, and marriages became legendary. Several times he divided his own weight in gold or silver among Brahmans. At great feasts and on "auspicious" occasions, he gave clothing and gifts to village leaders and their wives. On pilgrimage in Benares, he delivered rich gifts to the ex-Peshwa, Baji Rao; and on his way home from Ramesvaram, he paid the Nizam a *nazar* (gifts) of a lakh of pagodas just for the empty title of "Manur Sultan."²⁰

The Zamindars of Guntur vied with each other to keep up this brilliant ostentation, indulging in every vanity and fancy to such a degree that their annual spending would have supported "13 battalions of Native Infantry."²¹ Such extravagance led to rapid decay, the old story of dynastic decline occurring in miniature. Instead of zanana poisons, rebellions, and wars, family members and servants conspired and intrigued against each other. Supervision was relaxed for the sake of pleasure. Death resulted in disputed inheritance. Debts accumulated. Power was entrusted to Diwans bent on quick gains. Even though they reached lower and lower into the villages for needed funds, revenues failed to materialize.²²

Again using the Vasireddy Zamindari as an example, when Venkatadri Naidu died in 1816, a struggle of baffling complexity ensued. Liquid assets of 5.5 million pounds sterling disappeared within two years, insomuch that gold and silver had to be peeled off

pillars and copper off the roofs of palaces in order to pay *saukars* (bankers). Litigation over the disputed succession lasted thirty years.²³ Two Diwans (who were friends) pursued the litigation, hired pandits, bribed witnesses, bought mantrams, furnished entertainments, and finally provided loans for the young heirs (who were also friends). How this case moved by intricate turns through a tangled maze of English procedures, Hindu laws, and a court hierarchy is a story of 115 pages.²⁴ When the decision was finally handed down from the Privy Council in London, the issue no longer mattered; for the fortune was gone, the Zamindari was gone; many disputants were dead; and two Desastha families were known to be the wealthiest in that part of the country.²⁵

If the Zamindars were betrayed by their own family members and servants, they also engaged in a disastrous tug-of-war with village leaders. Financial pressure brought them into collision with Karnams and Ryots who themselves sought to keep back as much as possible. Both sides used every trick of deception and artifice of ingenuity.

The best hope of a Zamindar lay in cracking the shell of village solidarity. By dividing a village against itself and driving a wedge between leading communities or factions, he could play upon discord to pry out what he wanted. While one group of village leaders would grow fat, the rest would be picked clean. The favoured would attend *darbars*, *tamashas*, and *melas* and would be flattered with gifts of cloth and jewels, advances for seed, and loans for special need. The recalcitrant would be coerced with ingenious instruments, imaginative tortures and frightening invocations of evil spirits. There were countless methods of exaction.²⁶

Villages, however, were not unequal to such struggles. So long as their respective leaders remained united and were able to form silent combinations, they could present a tight phalanx. Secrecy was their shield and bribery their sword. Operating silently, they encroached on Zamindars with unremitting pressure, deceiving inspectors, bribing eyes until they closed, hiding true records, spiriting crops away by night, and burying wealth in secret places. At every turn, with disarming submissiveness and apparent poverty, these leaders matched wits with the Zamindars and their servants.²⁷

IV

The new bureaucracy which came to influence with the emergence of British rule owed its origin to an early start and near monopoly in language, the English language. European traders in India required the services of go-betweens or interpreters. Depending upon

caste or function, these go-betweens were variously called *Dubashis*, *Banyas*, *Diwans*, or in later times, *Babus*.²⁸

A small, compact group of Desastha Brahmans who knew English and who, by beating competitors and by jealously guarding and transmitting their secret skills through family apprenticeships, monopolized this knowledge of English, became entrenched in Guntur before the turn of the 19th century.²⁹ The key officer and leader of this elite of district officers was the Huzur Sheristadar, the go-between of go-betweens. This elite group had family links with the Manur Rao, Desastha Zamindars within the district, and with other Maratha Brahman families throughout South India.³⁰ At times, the group became so strong that it dominated the administration, resisted Government policies, and either thwarted or else sought to corrupt and even ruin successive British officers. Whenever control from Madras became weak, their power grew strong. Each growth of Maratha strength awoke internal factional strife, in which one group was supported by the Manur Rao while the other was supported by the Vasireddy.³¹

A serious disturbance of this kind occurred in 1811.³² Twenty years of control by two stronger Collectors followed; but another six years of weakness, in which fourteen British officers migrated through the Collectorship like wandering strangers and a third of the population was swept away by famine and pestilence, more than sufficed to bring submerged enmities to the surface.³³ In 1837, a struggle between the contending forces in the district broke out and the new Collector was caught in the middle.

John Goldingham found that "the district had suffered greatly because of irregularities" and that both the governmental structure and the people were threatened. Without first "removing those who had brought about this state of things, who by their commanding influence in the Huzur [were] organizing instead of checking corruption," he could see no remedy.³⁴ Ready assistance was offered by the faction which had been trying for thirty years to displace the ruling oligarchy. Sabnavis Venkata Krishna Rao was made Huzur Sheristadar by the Collector; and he promptly began to fill the administration with his own men.³⁵

The metal of the old leaders, however, had yet to be put to the test. Under the leadership of Nyapati Shashagiri Rao, a veteran with more than thirty years experience, the entrenched were able to turn back every assault upon their position. In this they were solidly supported by the Madras Board of Revenue. Time after time, Shashagiri Rao went over the head of the Collector. Krishna Rao's appointment was disallowed; and Shashagiri Rao was forced upon the

Collector. Each time Goldingham dismissed him, invariably the Board insisted that he be reinstated as Huzur Sheristadar. After each contest of strength, the Sheristadar's prestige went up while that of the Collector went down. All Goldingham's careful reports were rejected and his pleadings were unavailing insomuch that, after five years of this, he begged the Governor to send him to another district. The rival faction was defeated and the old leaders prevailed.³⁶

The crowning exhibition of local power was Shashagiri Rao's scheme to discredit the new Collector, to increase the power of his group, and to conciliate village leaders, all at one blow. For over three years, Huddleston Stokes was unaware that:

...the whole of his servants were in league against him and that they made common cause with the people, both parties participating in the advantages to be gained at the expense of the revenue.³⁷

Suspicious which he voiced and mild suggestions for improving efficiency were quashed. The Board of Revenue held it wrong to go against the judgment of so old and trusted a servant as Shashagiri Rao, even on simple and valid points.³⁸ By the time Stokes realized the full nature of the conspiracy against himself and against the State, his health had broken and he was forced to go to the Cape on sick leave.

The new Acting Collector, a young and inexperienced officer named Lockhart, was no match for the wily old Sheristadar and was completely taken in. By this time, however, people in Madras were beginning to suspect that something was drastically wrong in the Northern Circars and particularly in Guntur. Although the economy had recovered from the great famine of 1833, district revenues had dropped from 12.2 lakhs to an all-time low of 5.5 lakhs. Henry Montgomery's report on Rajahmundry pointed to a silent and subversive conspiracy as the root of that district's troubles. A district-wide network of officers had been diverting revenues from the treasury to themselves.³⁹

Walter Elliot, one of the most experienced and able Civilians in Madras, and Appa Rao, one of the best Maratha Brahmans in the Presidency, were sent to Guntur. These officers plunged immediately to the root of the trouble. Karnams of a hundred villages were ordered to appear and show their records. These village leaders dutifully presented themselves but, when asked about their records, could only make appropriate sounds and gestures of sorrow. "Without exception, they declared that no such accounts existed."⁴⁰ Zamindars had taken their accounts into custody. Fire had destroyed. Thieves

had broken in. Storms and floods had come. White ants and silver fish had eaten. Misplaced books disappeared and became lost. Brother or uncle who normally kept books was away on pilgrimage, was sick unto death, was no more—and who could tell what *he* knew? The Commissioner and his Sheristadar, however, knew where and how to poke and probe. The records of Takkalapadu (Village) were ferreted out and severe examples of punishment were made; and suddenly, many remembered where their records were kept. Amid more gestures and sounds of sorrow, much extortion and bribery was confessed.

At this, the district officers took alarm. Acting as a group, they bent every effort to stifle the investigation and counter the Commission's work. Obstacles of every sort, small and big, were thrown up. As the first effects of Elliot's presence wore off, and as they were bolstered up by promises, bribes, and threats, many of the Karnams rallied and resisted with every device of their imaginations. Elliot soon became convinced that he was confronting something more than just ordinary corruption. As he put it, "a general and well organized combination of the Collector's establishment—was able at once to act with vigor and concert throughout every part of the district."⁴¹ Nevertheless, while Shashagiri Rao held court and sent messengers from his house in Guntur, Elliot and Appa Rao moved relentlessly from village to village.

Affairs in most of the major villages of the district were investigated.⁴² Almost invariably, after original village accounts were separated from those which were spurious—there were often three sets: one for the Zamindar, one for the State, and the true one,—years of unauthorized collections, extortionate rack-renting, and extensive bribery would be uncovered. Attempts to palm off fabricated accounts were the rule. Some false accounts had been written and kept ready for years, ready to be shown on the right occasion. True accounts were found in wells or tanks, torn up or burned, buried, hidden in grain, or otherwise disposed of when an inspector came too near. Once, a whole house was set ablaze to destroy damning records. "The inspector got out. The records didn't."⁴³

Elliot's report on Guntur came as a shock to British authorities in Madras and London. In less than twelve years Madras had lost over 74 lakhs, more than six times the annual revenue from the district.⁴⁴ Disclosures from other districts soon revealed that Guntur was no isolated case.

V

It is clear that, just as district officers undermined central authority, they in turn were undermined by village leaders. As soon

as a subordinate officer accepted village money, he was vulnerable (or responsible) only until he brought his superior into the transaction. By passing blame to his superior, he shielded himself from the wrath to come. The higher corrupting influence of villages spread into the hierarchy of power, the more shields there were between village leaders and eventual retribution. Level by level, superiors became prisoners to those below them and risked exposure and discipline from those above them. Power became caught and tangled in the webs of village, caste, and family influence. The strength of Madras Presidency was tied to the earth by countless tiny threads and was made captive to Lilliputian systems of power.

The Huzur Sheristadar was most vulnerable. Blame stopped with him. When revenues failed, he had to supply reasons. Bad climate, disease, and low prices served as excuses for only so long. The gullability, inefficiency, wrong judgment, or laziness of the British Government had limits. Then the blow would fall and vacancies would occur in the upper cadres. But the Guntur leaders were accustomed to this; and indeed, they had gone through the process several times without their re-entry into district service being jeopardized. Their very uncertain tenure, combined with their preferred status and their nepotistic hold on the high positions, encouraged them to make the most of their moments in power. Family and caste loyalty—Shashagiri Rao alone had 74 family members in district service within Guntur—and steady pressure from lower levels tended to compel collusive operations.⁴⁵

In light of such circumstances, the question as to whether systematic collusion and corruption originated and was organized by Desasthas at the top or village leaders at the bottom of the district hierarchy is hard to answer. But basic orientation of segmented social values being such that primary loyalties were directed to family (or caste) and village (or patrimonial) interests and obligations, rather than loyalties to any general population, wider “public”, or centralized system of political power, it is not difficult to presume that propensities for such behaviour to originate could be found at every level. Once such behaviour began or corrupting operations reached a more advanced stage, however, Desasthas would do all possible to organize and control the process in their own interests. But again, in this they would have to match wits with village leaders of other castes.

Over the long run, the British were able to devise some very thorough and lasting solutions to stem localizing power processes, perhaps more thorough and lasting than had ever been done before. They combined a growing awareness of problems with a realistically self-critical, self-corrective and analytical faculty which was being

carried along in the main stream of the growing and modernizing technological age. British resources and persistence had a relentless, almost machine-like quality so that, while wheels turned slowly, they were able to make steady progress.

It was realized that local forces were able to blunt government measures because of their facility in forming silent combinations and thereby in controlling channels of communication. By hiding or fabricating vital information, local leaders kept rulers in ignorance or worse, in partial ignorance. Remedies were devised. Regularly appointed and paid Village Headmen (called *Munsifs*) were installed as a counterpoise to the Karnams. Marathi as a medium of exchange between Telugu and English was abolished. Record offices, which had been kept in such purposeful muddles that an estimated six years were needed to set them in order were eventually reorganized completely.⁴⁶ English schools admitting members from all communities were established during the 1840's and 1850's; and these broke the Maratha Brahman monopoly on the higher administrative positions. Shortly thereafter, in 1861, the doors to the Indian Civil Service were opened to Indians, thus providing an escape valve for the energies of the Desasthas and other groups who soon would follow them.⁴⁷ Finally, regulations were passed at about the same time which forbade any two members of the same family from serving in the same district and any two members of the same caste from sharing the two top positions in the District Headquarters (*Huzur Cutcherry*).⁴⁸ Successful implementation of these policies released a sequence of revolutionary social changes which are still continuing today.

VI

Our analysis of the history of Guntur has revealed that from generation to generation local interests sought to resist interference and non-local interests sought to interfere in the affairs of a deltic area. Localizing forces arising from villages struggled with each other but combined to thwart the actions of predatory forces from outside. Centralizing agents tried to enforce compliance from local leaders. Localizing energies tried to corrupt and undermine "foreign" agencies. Clashes of sword and pen occurred within the intermediate institutions and areas between the villages and the cities where regal power centered. Struggle revolved around the corruptibility or loyalty of go-betweens. In the days of the Company Bahadur, as in former days, localizing and centralizing forces collided in the actual day-to-day politics and functions of government; moreover, they left marks in degrees of disorganization or organization, in channels and blockades, in staff

selections and reshuffles, in black ink and red-tape, and in countless decisions and forms set up to control or obstruct political machinery. The side which most thoroughly controlled this machinery saw its interests advance.

It should be apparent by now that, in seeking to understand exceedingly complex processes of power, deliberate care has been taken to avoid confusing or indiscriminate use of the term "state." This Western concept, though increasingly refined and broken down into various categories by political theorists, so far largely fails to fit the circumstances of institutionalized systems of power which prevailed in pre-modern India. By state we usually mean an entity defining a condition of political existence with processes which have at least certain minimum attributes. Such a system of power must be organized so as to have exclusive and formal (or legitimate) authority enabling it to exercise supreme force (or sanctions) within a definite and integrated territory over an indefinite but continuous period of time. But the existence of a formal, territorially expanding, organizationally sophisticated, and administratively centralizing accretion of power called "state" poses questions as to whether less formal if not clandestine, ever simplifying and fragmenting systems of power can, as shadow forms of power, be so constituted that they inadvertently act to negate state power.

Search for new analytical concepts adequate for dealing with baffling political forms and processes in the non-Western world must lead at times to some almost bizarre new approach. It is helpful in some such cases to construct a mock-up to serve as a working model; and in this we can perhaps learn from the physical or biological sciences. Drawing a parallel from concepts of "anti-matter" and "anti-body," I have fabricated a mock-up concept and called it "anti-state."⁴⁹ "Anti-state," as used here, denotes a kind of political system which, residing within a state, disperses its power and proliferates itself to the detriment of the State and acts in such a way that it not only naturally opposes but actually prevents the State from functioning properly. In this sense, by covert or overt antagonism to any exogenous or "foreign" system of power, "anti-state" types of power cannot be anything but antigenic and antidotal to the normal processes and tendencies of state power, as defined above. Thus, if state is conceived to be a positive element, anti-state is negative (or vice versa). But, in either case, although their processes may be characteristically different—the one centralizing and the other localizing—, both are conceived essentially as being systems of power.

In other terms, it is significant that historical sources for pre-modern India have very little to show in the way of maps and very

little to say about boundaries between larger systems of power.⁵⁰ Certainly great kings liked to note the number and size of their provinces, districts, and villages; but these notes were either vague or otherwise abstract. Indeed, with the exception of occasional boundary disputes between villages, we know virtually nothing about the boundaries of dynastic systems. Even villages have shown a distinct aversion to fixity of boundary markers. Of great cities where power was centralized and its splendor made apparent, such as Tanjore, Vijayanagara, Hyderabad and Poona, we can be sure. But of frontiers, we can only grope in blind uncertainty. Furthermore, we read of annual forays by the armies of each power in which opposing forces crossed and re-crossed what we would normally feel to be the lands of other dynastic systems with impunity and with little regard for the niceties of territorial integrity. If this were not enough, different centralized powers seem to have ruled congruently over the same territories, to have shared the same intermediate agencies and administrative apparatus, and to have laid claim to revenues from the same villages. (The Peshwas of Poona and the Nizam of Hyderabad did this in the 18th century, to name just one example.) What the British found when they came to Guntur in 1788 serves as a prize example of indeterminate and diffused power. Roughly a thousand villages were so intermingled among the four great zamindari families that "the Zamindars might have done just as well if they had drawn their villages by lot"—some villages were actually shared by two or three Zamindars.⁵¹

In his *Twilight of the Mughals*, Percival Spear drew a parallel between conditions of North India, where the State regarded sturdy villagers as bandits and local lords regarded the State as a robber, and Augustine's incisive observation—"The State is a great robber band, for robber bands, what are they but little states?"⁵² The same parallel might be drawn with pre-modern South India. Only what seems to emerge from our analysis of South India are "box-within-box" congeries of robber bands within robber bands, composite systems of power within power with varying amounts of state and anti-state properties. Moreover, the larger and more regal or imperial was a traditional system of power, the less it retained of the accepted properties of a state, by Western standards. Shortages of loyal and dependable manpower, which could only come from the limited resources of family and caste, became more apparent as power grew to imperial strength. But the smaller and more local was a system, the more it took on the properties of a state. The Sword and Pen of Hyderabad was far less indivisible than that of Chebrole.

Largest (if not only) degrees of political homogeneity seem to have existed in a bewildering variety of very local patrimonial systems

(of extended families and villages) which were often territorially dispersed by other intervening, "foreign," but local systems. These local systems, all interlocked within larger structures and wider areas, functioned with reference to each other as tiny states and with reference to regal or imperial forces as anti-states—giving signs of submission in forms of compliance and tokens of revenue but reserving as much substance as possible for themselves. One can find no broad bedrock of ultimate loyalty beyond family, caste, and village and beyond patrimonial relationships surrounding an intricate complexity of local lords and lordlings of the soil.

VII

So far the primary emphasis of this study has been on one area. We have made an intensive and comparative examination of events in one district of South India. But we should not delude ourselves by thinking that our findings pertain only to an exceptional, isolated case or that the phenomena described do not have broader applicability. Indeed, evidences of political processes such as those observed in Guntur can be found in the history of virtually every part of South India.

Instances of localizing influence in various parts of the peninsula have been too numerous even to catalogue. A few cases where sword or pen was so exercised may be cited, however, simply to show the wider prevalence of the processes in question. During the 1830's alone, when Company power was at its zenith, the Purla-Kimedi and Gumsur rebellions led to costly jungle campaigns;⁵³ there was a rising of the Moplahs in Malabar,⁵⁴ an insurrection in Canara,⁵⁵ and an outbreak among the Khond tribes⁵⁶; the Nawab of Kurnool was implicated in the Wahabi conspiracy;⁵⁷ and a threat of revolt in Mysore had to be investigated.⁵⁸ S. R. Chaudhri's *Civil Disturbances during the British Rule in India: 1756-1857* (Calcutta: 1955) serves to list the more violent incidents. The history of recurring mutiny within the British-Indian army in India is well enough established not to warrant repetition here.⁵⁹ In the sphere of collusion and subversion, perhaps the most notorious case in the Madras Presidency was that of Casee Chetty, the Coimbatore Treasurer whose ingenious fabrications and daring embezzlements became so extensive that he came to regard the administration as his shop and the district as his commodity for trade. For a decade he used British power for his own purposes and reaped enormous profits. His dismissal in 1817 was based upon known embezzlements amounting to 4,18,316 pagodas.⁶⁰ Subversive combinations prompted the British to take over the administration of Mysore

in 1830.⁶¹ During the decade between 1840 and 1850, serious administrative deterioration in Vellore, South Arcot, Madura, Rajahmundry, Bellary, Tinnevely, and Masulipatam, successively provoked the Madras authorities into appointing special commissions of enquiry.⁶² Henry Ricketts, the Commissioner appointed to investigate administrative organization throughout India, wrote concerning South India:

....in every district, in a greater or lesser degree, the whole body of public servants form a combination, bound together by strong ties of interest (not only out of hope of gain but out fear of injury) and often of family or caste connection, to maintain abuses.⁶³

He reckoned the average siphoning of revenues into the pockets of Desastha officers at a minimum of 70 lakhs of rupees a year for Madras Presidency.⁶⁴

Finally, taking a longer view of traditional processes which have been shown clearly to have existed during the days of the Company, there seems to be little doubt that localizing tendencies have played a dominant role in the history of South India. The comparatively small proportions of time in which greatly centralized powers have held sway in local areas, the indirect and delegated and socially segmented (or insulated) quality of central power under great kingdoms and empires, and the narrowly constricted and compartmentalized nature of socially "civic" or "public" spirit and political consensus in pre-modern times were probably the chief contributing factors behind this tradition.

1. Precise conceptual tools for describing either political processes or entities which, when observed closely, manifest themselves in bewildering patterns (now feudal, then tribal, again imperial, now regal, or patrimonial, or communal, in seemingly endless permutation and variety) has yet to be discovered.

2. The area of Guntur District is now listed as 5,795 square miles. Its population in 1847 was listed at 411,599, and in 1961 at 3,009,997.

3. Elliot Mss., *Local History I*, "On the Origin of Village Accountants," (India Office Library, abbr. IOL: Mss. Eur. F. 46), pp. 93-97; and *Local History III*, "Historical Memoir of Chebroliu," (IOL: Mss. Eur. F. 48), pp. 91-104. Note: Translations of stone and copper inscriptions, together with writings on *cadjan* leaves, show how elite groups regarded their past, cf. *South Indian Inscriptions: Volume X* (Madras: 1948). Collected between 1788 and 1817 and then translated into Marathi and English by servants of Col. Colin Mackenzie, the village histories of Guntur in the Elliot Collection are enhanced by the fact that they come from important and old villages. These mixtures of fact, folklore and precept permit insights into tradition.

4. *Ibid.*, *Local History I*, "Translation of Dandakaville by Vadhamundi Kamaraz, Curnum of Peturu Village in Repalle Talook, Zillah Guntur," pp. 106.

5. G. Mackenzie, *A Manual of Kistna District* (Madras: 1883), pp. 1-50. op. cit., *Local History I*, "Condauid Country, or Guntoor," pp. 103-105. K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, *A History of South India* (Madras: 1955), pp. 271-287.

6. Useful analytical tools are found in the ideas of Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: 1953).

7. Boswell, J. A. C., *A Manual of Nellore District* (Madras: 1873), pp. 202-260. Norton, J. B. *A Letter to Lowe on the Condition of the Madras Presidency* (Madras: 1854), p. 206. See recent sociological and anthropological studies for greater elaboration.

8. R. Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire* (London: 1924) is still a minor classic; but I am particularly indebted to the ideas expressed by K. A. Nilakantha Sastri. Also to be consulted are R. Sathianatha Aiyar, *History of the Nayaks of Madras* (Oxford: 1924) and *Tamilaham in the 17th Century* (Madras: 1956), together with the works of T.V. Mahalingam, B. A. Saletore, N. Venkataramanayya, and V. Vriddhagirisan. District Manuals are especially helpful sources of social history.

9. M. G. Ranade, *Rise of the Maratha Power and Other Essays* (Bombay: 1961), pp. 1:19. R. Sathianatha Aiyar, *Tamilaham in the 17th Century*. (Madras: 1956).

10. Elliot Mss., *op. cit.*, "Origin of Village Accountants," p. 101; and "Translations of Dandakavile at Condaivid Village by Vinnacotta Venkanah," p. 331, ff; and Volume III, "Historical Memoir of Chebrole in the Districts of Chintapilly," p. 100, translated from Telugu into Marathi and from Marathi into English by Venkata Rao in 1817.

11. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 332.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 333-34. Read parallel accounts in Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-38, and H. Morris, *A Descriptive and Historical Account of the Godavery District* (London: 1878), pp. 167-76. Note: Tanisha, the last king, probably had good practical reasons for keeping local Hindu bureaucracies. Firmans indicate that these Shia kings developed a sophisticated state cult in which their kingship was deified.

13. Elliot Mss., vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 101. Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

14. *Ibid.*, vol. II, "Lists of Hakims or Officers Administering the Gontoor and Ellore Circars," pp. 62-71.

15. James Grant, "Political Survey of the Northern Circars." cf. W. K. Firminger (ed.), *The Fifth Report, Vol. III* (Calcutta: 1918), p. 26.

16. Walter Elliot (Report on Guntur District) to Government of Madras (para. 99), April 17, 1846: *Madras Revenue Proceedings and Consultations* (IOL: range 3281 vol. 20), December 6, 1847.

17. Great Britain. House of Commons. *The Fifth Report of 1812, Appendix 13* James Grant, "Political Survey of the Northern Circars," (IOL: Parliamentary Collection No. 56, pp. 631-32).

18. There were four Zamindaris in Guntur: i.e. the Kammavaru Vasireddy family of Chintapalli and Amaravati, the Telegavaru Malrazu family of Navasaraopet, the Velle-mavaru Manika Rao family of Repali, and the Desastha Manur Rao families of Chilka-marpet and Sattanapalli.

19. Walter Elliot's Report to Government of Madras, (para 13). *op. cit.*

20. Elliot Report, (para. 7), *ibid.* John Goldingham to C. R. Cotton (paras, 13-17, 30), December 13, 1839; *Madras Revenue Proceedings & Consultations* (range 380: vol. 7: pp. 2470-74), No. 30 of April 16, 1841. The Goldingham Report is a lengthy study of the social and economic conditions of Guntur.

21. Elliot Report (para. 7).

22. Goldingham Report (paras. 46, 38), *op. cit.* In the case of Guntur Zamindars, the Permanent Settlement was set at an amount far below what was recommended by either Collector or Zamindars; moreover, roughly 90 lakhs of rupees in public and private debts were cancelled and full revenue payments were deferred eight years. Even so, in 1837, the Zamindars were worse off than they had been in 1802, when the settlement was made.

23. Goldingham Report (para. 30); Elliot Report (paras. 7, 16), *op. cit.*

24. E. F. Moore (ed.), *Reports of cases heard and determined by the Committee of the Privy Council on Appeal from the Supreme and Sudder Dewanny Court in the East Indies, Vol. IV: 1846-50* (London: 1930), pp. 1-113. Governor Munro found the heirs tired of the suit and willing to stop; but the Diwans prevented this. cf. A. J. Arbuthnot, *Selections from.....Writings of Sir Thomas Munro* (Madras: 1886), p. 196.

25. G. Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

26. Elliot Report (para. 16), *op. cit.*, Examples of chants and spells are found in Elliot's note books., cf. R. Sewell, *Sir Walter Elliot of Welselee* (Edinburgh: 1896). Arzi (Deposition) of S. V. R. Rao on conditions in Guntur Zillah, Appendix A of Goldingham Report, *op. cit.* P. B. Smollet, *Civil Administration of Madras* (Madras: 1858), pp. 1-34. J. B. Norton, *A Letter.....on the Condition of the Presidency of Madras* (Madras: 1854), p. 206. *The Torture Commission Report* (Madras: 1855), pp. 14, 17, 36-47, reveals methods of exaction which were customary.

27. Daniel Smith to Board of Revenue, June 21, 1806 Extract in Elliot Report (paras. 82-83), *op. cit.* Knowledgeable village leaders were by no means blind to the impunity

afforded to themselves by Regulation XXX of 1802, cf. F.R. Hemingway, *Godavery District Gazetteer* (Madras: 1907), p. 164 ff.

28. We have already noted how such groups entered Guntur in the Golconda period. M. Ruthnaswamy, *Some Influences that made the British Administrative System in India* (London 1939), pp. 87, 293.

29. A fascinating account of how English was learned under the old system of education is found in: V. V. Gopal Row, *The Life of Vennelacuty Soob Row, Native of Ongole, Translator and Interpreter to the Late Surdr Court, Madras, from 1815 to 1829.* (Madras: 1873).

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-30, 62-70. Soob Row, in visiting other districts, had an uncle, a cousin, a wife's brother, etc. who was Huzur Sheristadar, Head Munshi, Head English Accountant and so on. See also: J. A. B. Dykes, *Salem: An Indian Collectorate* (London: 1852), pp. 332, 327, E. H. Aitken, *Behind the Bungalow* (Calcutta: 1889), p. 75.

31. For details see: R. E. Frykenberg, *The Administration of Guntur District with Special Reference to Local Influences on Revenue Policy: 1837-1848* (London: Unpublished Thesis, 1961), chs. three and four.

32. F. W. Robertson to Board of Revenue, February 21, 25, April, 15, May 19, June 15, July 1, August 20, 1811: *Guntur District Records* (vol. 385: pp. 23-39, 44-50, 66-74, 211-223;.....303-320). Many of these letters are found in Appendix C of Elliot Report, *op. cit.*

33. Elliot Report (para. 96), *ibid.*, "Chart of Officers appointed Acting or Permanent to the Office of Collector." Mackenzie *op. cit.*, pp. 113, 358. A graphic description of the great Guntur Famine was made by Col. Walter Campbell, *My Indian Journal* (Edinburgh: 1864), p. 424.

34. John Goldingham to Board of Revenue (paras. 2-14), January 5, 1839; *Guntur District Records* (vol. 5397: 1-24.)

35. Board of Revenue to Goldingham, November 9, 1837: *Guntur District Records* (vol. 5368: p. 281); and Goldingham to Board of Revenue, November 24, 1837: *Guntur District Records* (vol. 5393: pp. 222-227).

36. Elliot Report (paras. 55-58). *op. cit.* Daniel White (Report) to Board of Revenue, (paras. 39-42, 61), July 10, 1845: *Guntur District Records* (No. 58 in vol. 5404; pp. 79:139).

37. Elliot Report (para. 50). *Ibid.*

38. Board of Revenue Proceedings, November 10, 1842; *Guntur District Records* (vol. 5373: pp. 431-457), dealing with Stokes' letter of October 25, 1842. How Guntur affairs looked from Madras on the eve of Stoke's departure may be found in the Board's Proceedings on the Jamabandi Report for Fasli 1252, August 26, 1844: *Guntur District Records* (vol. 5373: pp. 297-337).

39. Sir Henry Montgomery to George Drury (Madras Government Chief Secretary), March 18, 1844: *Madras Records Proceedings and Consultations* (range 280: vols. 48 & 49: pp. 2090-2292), No. 8 of May 28, 1844. The records of this period were filled with heated controversy on how to deal with the Guntur problem. A bitter fight occurred between Governor Tweeddale and Henry Chamier, the First Member in Council. See Nos. 42-48 of September 10, 1844, *Madras Revenue Proceedings & Consultations* (range 280: vol. 52).

40. Elliot Report (para. 24), *op. cit.*

41. Elliot Report (para. 25), *ibid.*

42. Elliot Report (para. 27-28, 43-48), *ibid.*

43. Elliot Report (para. 27), *ibid.*

44. Court of Directors to Government of Madras (paras. 29-31), January 31, 1849: *Madras Despatches* (vol. 111: pp. 455-530), No. 1 of 1849. A summary of reactions at each level may be obtained in the *Board's Collections*, No. 116, 221, Vol. 2272 (i.e. Board of Control) in the India Office Library.

45. Elliot Report (para 58) *op. cit.* A detailed report on the activities of this remarkable Sheristadar was made by Daniel White of the Board of Revenue, July 10, 1845: *Guntur District Records* (vol. 5405: pp. 79-139).

46. A detailed list of recommendations for Guntur which were slowly carried out during the next 20 years is contained in paras. 82-105 of the Elliot Report. Complaints about Marathi were made by J.D. Bourdillon, in his *Remarks on the Ryotwar System of Land Revenue as it exists in the Presidency of Madras* (Madras: 1853) and by J. B. Norton, *A Letter.....on the Condition of the Presidency of Madras* (Madras: 1854), p. 136.

47. A. Howell, *Education in India prior to 1854, and in 1871* (Calcutta: 1872), is most useful on this subject. For a view of what happened at the local level, see John Noble, *A Memoir of the Rev. Robert T. Noble Missionary to the Telugu People of India* (London: 1867) pp. 266-71 190 292 296 350. See also: A. J. Arbuthnot *Papers Relating to Public Instruction in Madras* (Madras : 1855).

48. T.G.K. Pillay, *The Revenue Compendium of Madras Presidency, Volume 1* (Madras: 1873) pp. 120-123.

49. "Counter-state" has also been suggested by one helpful critic, as an alternate term.

50. I am aware of some references to boundaries in the chronicles of the time and of the existence of boundary stones hedges, etc., but this does not affect the point I am making about the political reality of the boundaries.

51. Gordon Mackenzie, *Manual of Kistna District* (Madras: 1883), p. 345.

52. Spear, Percival, *Twilight of the Mughals* (Cambridge: 1952), p. 126.

53. Russell, G. E., *Report on the Disturbances in Purla Kimeddy, Vizapatnam and Goomsoor in 1832-36* (Madras: 1856); Selections from Records series.

54. Innes and Evans, *Malabar District Gazetteer* (Madras: 1908), pp. 83-89.

55. Letters on Canara Insurrection: *Elphinstone Collection* (IOL: Eur. Mss. F. 87), Box 3-C Nos. 8-13.

56. T. J. Maltby, *A Manual of Ganjam District* (Madras: 1918), pp. 154-59.

57. N. G. Chetty, *A Manual of Kurnool District* (Madras: 1886), p. 41.

58. Shashagerry Row to Commissioner, October 15, 1838; *Elphinstone Collection* (*op. cit.*,) No. 39.

59. Ruthnaswamy, M., *Some Influences That Made the British Administrative System in India* (London: 1939), pp. 220-227.

60. Ruthnaswamy, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-306. *Selections of Papers from the Records of the East India Company* (London: 1820-26), Vol. I, 1820. It was Sir Thomas Munro who finally unveiled the work of Casee Chetty.

61. Venkatasubha Sastri, K. N., *The Administration of Mysore Under Sir Mark Cubbon* (London: 1932), pp. 1-31.

62. Although District Manuals will mention these cases, full treatment is only to be found by consulting respective series of district records.

63. Ricketts, H., *Report of the Commissioner for the Revision of Civil Salaries and Establishments* (Calcutta: 1858), part I, p. 343.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 346.