

**Ulrich Demmer**

## **JENU KURUMBA CULTURE: A TRADITION OF MORAL ARGUMENTATION**

'In my view, whatever humans are, they are certainly argumentative animals..... not always shrilly or aggressively so, but surely, fundamentally so'. (Fernandez 1986: vii).

In this article I argue that it is useful to conceive of culture as a tradition of persuasion and argumentation. It has long been argued that cultural communities can be understood fruitfully in terms of moral debate and ethical dialogical reasoning. Alasdair MacIntyre proposed that moral communities constitute themselves through the use of practical reason and people's continuous engagement with a living ethical tradition. Such an ethical tradition is best conceived, as a 'historically extended, socially embodied argument' about the goods considered most important to those who argue about them (MacIntyre 1984: 222). Indeed, ethical traditions are, in a very basic sense, ways of working out qualitative ways of living, or, as MacIntyre (*ibid.*) said, an 'ongoing extended argument about the goods.'

Drawing on MacIntyre's argument, Anand Pandian (2009) has empirically demonstrated the ways the Kallar in South India cultivate their culture as a moral tradition through moral argumentation and ethical debate. The Kallar understand and identify themselves with reference to the question 'how ought one to live?' and they construct their ethical world with the 'myriad practices through which people engage their own acts, desires, and feelings as objects of deliberation and critique, cultivation and transformation' (Pandian 2008: 468). In the following sections I will take this idea and propose that the moral community of the Jenu Kurumba in South India is also best understood as a 'tradition of argumentation.' I will take this phrase more literally, however, and argue that such a tradition is essentially constituted by rhetorical and poetical processes.

In doing so, I also propose that it is useful to restate the concept of culture in terms of moral negotiation and argumentation. Rather than forgetting culture, or writing it out of theory, it seems more adequate to follow Ortner's (1997) suggestion and rethink the concept. In what follows, I argue

that it is a turn to a dynamic and dialogic rhetoric that enables us to conceive culture in those terms. It has been widely accepted that cultures are constituted by and through complex agencies. What we should not forget, however, is that this is not primarily due to the modern or global condition but emerges from the very conditions of being a human and social being and thus from ontology.

### **A social constructionist approach to rhetoric culture**

Culture bears a close and very basic relationship to rhetoric. This was argued early on in Greek Sophist philosophy (cf. Vickers 1998) where the foundation of the community was seen in public debate and rhetorical discourse. In the wake of scientific reasoning this idea surfaced again and again and was more recently proposed by such diverse social philosophers as MacIntyre (1981) and Habermas (1988: 44-9). In anthropological theories of culture this idea is also articulated; and Fernandez (1986), Tyler (1978) and Strecker (1988) have argued explicitly for a 'rhetorical turn'. Emphasizing the dilemmatic and uncertain nature of human sociality and identity, these authors foreground negotiation and argumentation as basic features of socio-cultural life.

In this essay I will take up an argument made elsewhere (Demmer 2014) in more detail. Based on the ethnography of the Jenu Kurumba in South India, I suggest viewing culture as a dialogic rhetorical tradition of persuasion and argumentation. More specifically I argue, along with Shotter (1993), that it is useful to conceptualise a rhetoric culture along two dimensions. One dimension consists in the social practice of people. Its study is concerned with the manifold ways argumentation is employed to construct and reconstruct social relations, moral identities, and meaningful resources. The prime issue here is the study of the various persuasive procedures of a rhetoric culture. In particular I will outline narratives, social memory and emotions. Together with well-studied devices, such as figurative images and tropes (cf. Fernandez 1986; Sapir and Crocker 1977), they constitute vital procedures of a rhetoric culture.

The second dimension relates to the resources of symbols and meanings themselves, to the 'poetical reservoir' that speakers draw upon in negotiation. This domain exists prior to actual instances of discourse and has an 'already-being-there' character that gives it the appearance of persistence and makes a rhetoric culture 'a tradition.' The kind of resources that are used depends on that 'person-worldview level' of a rhetoric culture. It is not, however, 'timeless' nor is its relevance or value simply 'given', unquestioned and self-evident. It can only persist through being used in the manifold practices where it is also regenerated, affirmed or where, if need arises, its content is modified, enriched or substituted. The first dimension, then, is concerned with the making of person-to-person relationships and the second domain with the construction of person-worldview relations.

### **Ontological grounds: the dilemmatic and rhetorical nature of social life**

The rhetorical character of culture derives from the dilemmatic nature of human sociality, for a number of reasons. First of all, as human beings, we are undetermined; we have very little specific innate programs in terms of which to behave and act. As a consequence we need to invent our ways of being and build up conventional and shared understandings 'from rules and plays to world views and cosmologies', as Fernandez (*ibid.*: xii) puts it. Their relevance, value and success, however, and this is the real dilemma, can't be taken for granted. As Tyler (*ibid.*: 148) points out, common understandings can disintegrate, or we simply fail 'to realize our rules and plays in the world . . . our reach so often exceeds our grasp.' (Fernandez 1986: xii). The result, in any case, is that to be human is 'to have, sooner or later, a gnawing sense of uncertainty - what I call here the "the inchoate" - which lies at the heart of the human condition.' (*ibid.*: x)

Yet, dilemmas and the 'inchoate' are not the end of social life and culture but its very beginning and this is exactly where rhetoric comes in. Faced with the disintegration 'of our world of previously unquestioned common understandings, we do not retreat into desperately silent loneliness, but are impelled instead to reaffirm and accomplish that world through constructive negotiation.' (Tyler 1978: 148). The same holds true when we fail to live according to common standards or fail to realize our views of a good life. Rather than giving up and declaring a proper life impossible, we are bound, as Fernandez (1986: vii) states, 'to wonder why this is so and to argue about the reason for this failure.' Hence it is that *homo sapiens* is basically *homorheticus* and that we 'endlessly argue over the appropriateness of those rules, plans, and world views. [Moreover] . . . we are a primate that makes promises to ourselves and to others and so often fails or is unable to keep these promises and this generates argument as well.' (*ibid.*).

The Jenu Kurumba provide further evidence for such a view and give some additional insights as to why social life and culture are rhetorical, why, as Fernandez in the initial epigraph claims, humans are fundamentally 'argumentative.'

The Jenu Kurumba are a tribal community of gatherer/hunters and forest-traders in South India. Their social fabric is marked by a key feature, namely by the absence of what is elsewhere called 'society.' There are no clan groups or other group-like and rule based institutions that regulate marriages or property nor are there legalizing institutions like a council of elders, chiefs or a court. In fact, the Jenu Kurumba do not organize their social life in terms of a 'society.' Instead they live in circles of approx. 300 to 350 persons and understand themselves as a moral community where social life necessarily has a pronounced negotiated quality.

An episode of fieldwork can demonstrate why that is so and what that means. At the beginning of my field-research I intended to write down the rules according to which, as textbooks say, a kinship based society works. Thus I was eager to fix the marriage rules of the Jenu Kurumba (who practice cross-cousin marriage) and I asked questions like 'Who are you going to marry?' Or, 'do you need to marry your father's sister son?' The answers I got, however, did not point at all to that direction. Obviously nobody thought that the social practice of actors is determined by external rules prescribed by the society. Maare, a girl of about 14 years, for example, said: 'Those who like one another can marry' or 'I do not have to marry anybody certain, I marry the one I like.' 'But perhaps you will have to marry Mari - or Kalan, the ones which are your close cross-cousins ? Or will you marry the one you like most?' But again Maare's answer was disappointing. 'I do not know', she said, 'it depends, perhaps Kalan or somebody else.' Of course, I thought, Maare is too young to know the rules and I asked her parents about it. But they confirmed Maare's view: 'She can live with whom she wants,' they said, but quickly added, 'she should not marry a bad chap, that will produce trouble. 'However,' they continued in a quite typical way, 'who can tell in advance?'

As this example shows (and many more could be cited) the two modes of action offered to us by social theory, namely self-determined and autonomous action on the one hand and rule guided externally determined action on the other hand, can't fully describe the social process in the moral community. Obviously, the idea that a person's social action is determined by external rules sounds strange to the Jenu Kurumba; the actors are not seen as 'automats'. Instead, one meets with a pronounced sense of self-determination and individual agency. In fact, a moral community and its good (!) social life is based on the active linkages of people to the moral standards as much as on their commitments and active relatedness to the other actors. Yet, at the same time, one doesn't find the idea that actors are fully autonomous either. Rather, all individuals must count with others in the moral space of the community and they must also be accountable; their actions are evaluated and judged and persons must be prepared to justify their actions in case they are required to do so. If they fail, they are held responsibility, they must answer to criticism and, under the threat of sanctions, they must be able to defend themselves.

Finally, nobody can fully control the outcome of an interpersonal social process. All actors can fail in their commitments to the moral standards, they forget, they go wrong, they neglect them and so forth. But they can also fail to relate properly to others, they act badly, they hurt each other and so on. In other words, who we are to each other, who is good, who is bad, who will act appropriately is an open question again and again. A 'good' social life, then, is always a precarious and open process where actors are concerned with the question: 'Who am I for others?' while, on the other hand, they must also be responsive to others and need to ask themselves: 'Who are others for me?'

Accordingly, social life in a moral community is unpredictable and inherently fragile. This open character of all morally oriented social life gives it the character of, as Shotter (1980) calls it, 'joint action': It is an ongoing formative process, in which all actors have to interweave their own course of actions *in* with the unpredictable acts of others. In it 'the participants have to build up their respective lines of conduct by constant interpretation of each other's ongoing lines of actions . . . and by the constant negotiation and justification of their own appropriate responses and positions.' (ibid.: 32). Moreover, as DuBois (2002) has shown in an empirical study, when persons 'take a stance,' even if they are all alone, they are engaged in a 'dialogic rhetoric.'

In moral communities, then, social life is dialectical and responsive. It involves an '*ethical logistics*,' as Shotter (1993: 111) puts it, a dialogic process in which all actors are constantly facing the task, dialogically and in the course of interaction with others, to specify their positions in the moral space of sociality as much as the character of what counts as a 'good life'. Ethical forms of living, then, can only be maintained and kept alive in an ongoing process of negotiation where

all our behaviour, even our own thought about ourselves, is conducted in an ongoing argumentative context of criticism and justification, where every argumentative 'move' is formulated as a response to previous moves (ibid.: 14).

Accordingly, a 'good' social life in practice is clearly a rhetorical achievement, rhetorical in the sense of involving a dialogic and mutual process of evaluation, criticism, justification and last but not least transformation or 'movement.' The rhetoric model of culture outlined in this chapter, then, does not propose a monologic and one-sided model of persuasion in the sense that a passive audience is impressed or even coerced into accepting the message instead of being convinced by it. In contrast, it is a rather dialogic and interactive notion of rhetorical discourse that is most significant here.

Such a notion of rhetoric is not new. It was developed by early Greek Sophist philosophers (cf. Billig 1987; Vickers 1998) who argued that rhetoric is a dialogic and developing process of mutual persuasion. In recent times, however, this has developed, in the wake of the 'new rhetoric' (Toulmin 1958; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969), into an elaborate theory of argumentation. Represented by Van Eemeren *et al.* (1997), this approach regards rhetorical events as contexts of controversy but also as procedures of collaboration. Moreover, it puts special emphasis on the transformative dimension of rhetoric. As Van Eemeren *et al.* put it, a central question for rhetoric is 'how opposing views come to be reconciled through the use of language' (1997: 215).

### **Culture, a 'two-sided' poetical resource**

If the social practice in moral communities consists largely in processes of rhetoric it is no less true, however, that in order to accomplish that actors

must have intellectual, symbolic or otherwise meaningful resources at hand to do so. A second dimension of a rhetoric culture, then, is the common pool of symbols, meanings and themes enabling the construction of what can be called the actor- worldview level of a rhetoric culture.

Cultural/social anthropology has a well established tradition of what such a resource is like. Some of the most influential versions, for example those of C. Geertz (1983) or V. Turner (1969), see it as a unitary corpus of symbols and ideas. This dimension of culture, it is argued, represents coherent cognitive models and moral worldviews that provide pre-formed undisputed answers to existential problems and function to direct social practice. Yet, as Asad (1983) has pointed out, such a concept (ultimately Parsonian) sees culture as the ultimate agent and overlooks the agency of actors/speakers. Moreover, it is seen as a closed system making it difficult to account for the empirical openness and changeability of ideas and symbols. In contrast, a rhetorical theory of culture sees it as a pool of multiple symbols and ideas providing the resources *from which actors/speakers can select and build up various and opposing positions and arguments. Moreover, as the cultural history of any culture shows, it is not sealed but open to enrichment, loss and modification. Culture as a persuasive tradition, then, does not only consist in a rhetorical social practice but also draws on a pluralistic or at least 'two-sided' system or reservoir of meanings. Thus,*

what we have in common with each other in our societies' traditions is not a set of agreements about meanings, beliefs or values but a set of two-sided 'topics' or dilemmatic themes or 'commonplaces' for use by us as resources, from which we can draw the two or more sides of an argument (Shotter 1993: 14).

What content, then, does this resource have? One aspect is certainly what Geertz (1983: 90) has called its unsystematic and common sense character. As such it 'comes in epigrams, proverbs, *ober dicta*, jokes, anecdotes, *contes moral . . .*' etc.. Most important, however, is the fact that the shaping of ideas is often based on artful language and poetic imaginary. This has been shown by cognitive anthropologists who point out that basic human concepts of morality, social relationships or the person are formed and expressed poetically, or in what Lakoff and Johnson (1999) call 'image schemes.' As this line of research reveals, cultures across the world use metaphors and other poetical devices to create the meaning of moral concepts, for example of parents' care taking, love, anger and other substantial social emotions and ideas. Cultural/social anthropology too provides rich ethnographic material proving that meanings are very often created through the figurative use of language. Not only metaphors but, as Fernandez (1986) shows, almost the whole range of tropes like metonymy, synecdoche or allegory are used to imagine social relationships and cultural concepts (cf. Demmer 2001; 2002 ). Indeed, the poetic use of language seems to be able to create what Salmond (1982) has called a

‘semantic landscape’ of a culture, a resource that enables people to make sense of their world and to construct positions and arguments.

This is also confirmed by studies of ritual performances which often provide contexts where key concepts of a culture/society are made explicit. Thus, studies (cf. Sherzer 1983; Kuipers 1990) indebted to the ‘ethnography of speaking’ as well as the poetic approaches of Roseman and Laderman (1996) demonstrate how participants in rituals around the world use figurative language and poetic imaginary. Artful language, then, is used to remind actors, as Roseman (1996: 259) puts it, ‘who they are and how the world works.’ Accordingly, the *poiesis* of ritual performances is a privileged context for the study of cultural resources because, as Laderman (1996: 125) writes ‘concepts unexpressed in daily life [come] to the fore.’ On the man-worldview level, then, ‘culture’ is made possible by poetical reservoirs that provide the key images and themes for moral reasoning and argumentation. Moreover, the empirical data of the Jenu Kurumba clearly show that it is also a ‘two-sided’ reservoir; namely a set of poetically formed and opposing notions of how life should be and not be, what is bad and what is good. It is this poetical plurality or ‘two-sidedness’ of culture that makes a rhetorical tradition possible. In what follows we will pursue how this process unfolds among the Jenu Kurumba along the two dimensions outlined above and see how moral relationships and cultural resources are constructed rhetorically.

### **A tradition of argumentation: The Jenu Kurumba**

We have already mentioned that the Jenu Kurumba have no political or judicial institutions like courts, chiefs or assemblies of elders where public negotiations of community issues could take place. In that culture it is solely religious performances where rhetoric is carried out. That rituals are often contexts of persuasion has been argued early on by Strecker whose ‘theory predicts that when we find elaborate forms of symbolic action there will exist some underlying motive of persuasion’ (1988: 208).

The Jenu Kurumba ethnography confirms that view and shows that rituals are a dialogic and interactive arena of debate and argumentation.<sup>1</sup>

In particular the death rituals, healing séances and the worship of deities are organized that way. Debates in all three rituals are performed between the Jenu Kurumba on the one hand and their shamans on the other. The latter act as vehicles or carriers of the other-than-human beings, namely the deities and the dead. Those beings are conceived as substantial members of the moral community who not only act but who are, like human beings, responsible and accountable beings as well. The moral community thus includes all moral beings that the Jenu Kurumba acknowledge as such and accordingly their rhetorical culture is an encompassing one, including the deities as well as the dead. However, all actual communication between these

beings takes place in ritual settings. Mediated through the shamans the deities as well as the dead discuss and interact with their relatives the vital issues of their community.

### ***The rhetoric of the healing ritual***

A healing ritual constitutes a discursive space where several speakers are engaged in argumentation (cf. Demmer 2006). First there is the patient who is placed near the fire in the middle of the ritual setting. Next to it sit a number of women. They act as singers who perform songs addressed to the deities. Accompanying the songs of the shaman they strive to convince these other than human beings to come up from the underworld and help their living relatives to combat the illness. Moreover, within that group there are usually some elder women who may also sing but will primarily act as discussants with the shaman, once he embodies the deities. Their intention is to defend the patient against the accusations and bad memories of the shamans (resp. the deities) and to advocate the patient.

This is also the concern of a group of men placed vis-à-vis the women at the other side of the fire. Together with the women they constitute ‘those who ask’ (*keldavaru*) and they will also be engaged in dialogue with the other than human beings. Last but not least there is the shaman. He is sitting close to the fireplace in the middle of men and women. He will gradually embody some of the deities and deceased who usually remain in the underworld but who, for the purpose of the ritual, come up and speak through the shaman.

Every discourse of the healing ritual unfolds in a rough pattern of rhetorical acts. It begins with the shaman shaking his rattles speedily and the women singing the refrains. These songs are addressed to the deities and are meant to calm them, to please them and to persuade them to come up with the shaman and talk with their relatives. While the singing and rattling continues the shaman is thought to travel down into the underworld. As he reports to the living when his shaking stops, he walks in the underworld and approaches the deities. From time to time he is joining the women’s songs on his way. Once he comes close to the deities, however, he changes from song into speech. Addressing the deities he depicts the miserable conditions of the patient and the suffering of its relatives, trying to move them to help. As he reports, this is not always successful immediately but he often approaches a number of them one after the other, humbling himself and depicting the living as, to quote a popular phrase, ‘human worms that have gone wrong and that can’t bear the suffering any more.’

More often than not the shaman’s rhetoric is successful and he can persuade them to come up to the ritual place. Once this is achieved the shaman’s own voice gets quiet and with the deities speaking the dialogues between them and the living begin. The most important goal of the healing

rituals is to win over the ancestors to helping the patient. It is the deities who have the power to prevent illness and also to stop it, even if it has already started to affect the person. Usually, however, the deities refuse to do so in the beginning. They assume that somebody is responsible for the illness and suggest that the humans suffer because they did not follow the moral maxims of the community. Accordingly, they are angry with the living and refuse to help. In fact, instead of readily offering their assistance they entangle (engage) the living in a series of dialogues about their moral conduct and about the social history of the humans. First, they gradually construct what is called an account (*kanaku*) of the patient and its relatives moral conduct in the past. They accuse the patient and its relatives of social carelessness, half-heartedness and inertia as far as their social commitment is concerned. They also recall the social history, in particular that of the patient, as a series of bad behaviour and accordingly create a negative sociography. Moreover, they suggest that the patient's illness and suffering is a deserved punishment for its wrongdoings.

The humans, however, argue against that. They seek to convince the deities to the contrary and to prove their good past behaviour and their moral integrity. Accordingly the patient and its relatives argue against the deities reconstruction of their moral history. They remind the deity of the patient's 'good' conduct in the past and narrate their good relations with the deities. They thus reconstruct the patient's history as a good narrative. In addition, they appeal to the deities morality. They articulate the helplessness of the patient, the innocence of the humans in general and they call into memory the earlier assistance and promises of help that the deities made towards them. Finally, the accused also point out the offerings which they gave to the deities right now in the course of the ongoing ritual. Shifting from narratives of the past to their performances in the present ritual they bring forth irresistible good arguments for their moral integrity.

Empirically the arguments of the humans are in most cases successful. Usually the humans admit that mistakes were made by either the patient or other relatives, they also promise to make good their misbehaviour and that they will observe the moral standards of the community. Yet, they also demand a fair response from the deities and this is usually happening too. After often elaborate exchanges of arguments the deities finally do agree to the positive reconstruction of the humans moral history and they also acknowledge the offerings that the humans gave to them in the course of the ritual itself. They demand that the living move on the good way in future and, after getting the humans positive response, they agree to fight against the illness and to help the patient to recover. In sum, then, all actors moved one another from crisis and conflicting point of views to reconciliation and a common ground; that is to a consensus on the, after all, good relationships and moral integrity of the people.

### ***The rhetoric of the death ritual***

Death rituals too are constituted as arenas of argumentation. It unfolds in two separate performances. The first is held shortly after the death of a person and is concerned with the burial of the body. Though rhetoric is not absent, here it is confined to public laments and social memory. Close relatives of the dead recall the good times they spent in the company of the dead person, how good their relationships were and how they miss the deceased. Those narratives and laments are addressed to the dead person, who is thought to live after the death of the body in an invisible form (*ga:li*). The speeches and wailings are rhetorical in the sense that the living want to appeal to the dead, they want to show that they still love them and that they want good relations with them in the future. They have to convince the dead that they are not responsible for their death. In short, they want to persuade it that they are not responsible. In the burial ritual, however, they don't get a reply from the dead. This only happens in the second phase of the dead ritual called *pole*.

The *pole* is conducted as soon as the dead's relatives have collected enough money to buy the necessary provisions for the feast that is part of that performance. The most obvious objective of the *pole* is to help the dead person to reach the underworld - in the company of the deities as well of the other dead. This, however, is not an easy task because the dead refuse to cooperate. They are not content with the laments and expressions of sorrow but to the contrary they feel neglected, they suspect that the living are not unhappy with their death and even suggest that the relatives or other Jenu Kurumba might have killed them with black magic. A death, then, raises serious questions as to who is responsible for the suffering of the dead and it puts the moral integrity of the people into doubt. This crisis of morality is argued out and solved in the *pole*. In it the ritual participants have to accomplish in fact a double transformation. On the one hand, they have to accomplish a movement in space and, literally, have to persuade the dead to reach the underworld and the ancestors. On the other hand, they also need to transform their respective positions in the moral space of the community. With good arguments they have to move one another towards reconciliation and trust - towards the 'common ground' of a good community.

Like the healing ritual the *pole* performance is organized as a discursive arena. In it two opposing parties are engaged in dialogue, namely the living relatives of the dead person on the one side and the shamans, who embody the dead person's spirit, on the other side. Endowing the dead with a voice and a body the shamans engage the living in a series verbal debates.

These dialogues are called the 'speech (or the words) of good and bad' (*olladu kettadu ma:tu*), and the themes discussed are, as it were, the good and bad moral conduct of the people and the history of their mutual social relationships. In these dialogues, the dead reproach the living of not behaving good towards them in the past, thus calling into question the sociality of their

relatives. This all the more, as with the death of humans there is always the suspicion that close relatives could have killed them, for example by means of black magic. Due to this distrust, the dead express their doubts to the fact that their relatives will really give their best in the ritual, and that they will really help them to reach the ancestors. In the course of debate the living argue against that and try to move the dead towards reconciliation and trust. The rhetoric of this moral discourse unfolds in a consistent pattern of argumentation.

In the beginning it is the living who initiate the dialogues. They ask the dead what kind of reproaches of wrong behaviour they make and whom exactly they accuse. The shamans, however, hesitate with their responses. The dead are considered lonely and weak and accordingly they remember only vaguely or simply mention that there exists an account (*kanaku*) of bad deeds of the relatives. Nonetheless the living continue to ask and as the dialogues proceed the dead gradually specify their reproaches. One by one they select some relatives who are standing close to the shaman for a deeper going debate. They remember the social relationships with their relatives and step by step recall in particular incidents of bad behaviour. They thus reconstruct their common social history with the living as a negative narrative. Yet, as the ritual is organized as a forum of argumentation the living reply to these reproaches. They argue against the bad narratives that the shamans are going to draw and remind them of the good relationships and deeds that they can remember. Moreover, they also raise the question of the past behaviour of the dead and suggest that the dead were not always as good as they now pretend to have been.

In the rhetorical process they strive to defend their reputation as good members of the community and persuade the dead that their reproaches and suspicions are unfounded. This structure of arguments results in the ritual unfolding as an alternating process of accusation and defence, of good and bad stories and speakers actively negotiating how to evaluate their common history.

Often the dead accept this memory and remember in their speeches the good social relations with some of the relatives. Nevertheless they continue the debate remembering the misbehaviour of others. Again the living argue against that. Though they never directly deny the truth of the bad memories they either recall the good events or they agree to the negative memories of the dead *but* ask them to forget it. They justify this request with two arguments. First they point out the general weakness of human beings who easily fail and forget their responsibilities. Moreover, more important than the bad are the good social relationships they maintained in the past. That conduct, the living argue, should be remembered and not the bad times. Second, they point to the present deeds of the people in question here in the ritual itself. They ask the shamans to recognize how much they have done already to make the

ritual a success and how much they do in order to help the dead to reach the underworld.

In response the dead often continue with the description of negative social biographies but finally they also suggest their readiness for reconciliation. As the dialogues continue gradually the dead give in to the arguments of the living. They acknowledge the good deeds that the relatives carried out for them in the present death ritual, confirm their good relations with the relatives and that they are happy with the outcome of the ritual. Sometimes the dead and the living also reach a consensus that other *ga:li* might have been responsible for the suffering and the death while in other performances those issues are simply left open. In the end both, the dead and the living, acknowledge their reconciliation in a last exchange of speeches. With this agreement on their good social biography and on the good deeds here in the ritual the debate comes to an end. The good words and deeds successfully moved people and transformed relationships. This, the Jenu Kurumba say, 'made the dead happy' and with the shaman sinking to the ground the dead are said move into the underworld.

### ***The rhetoric of the pu:ja (persuasion of the deities)***

The third context of argumentation is the so called *pu:ja*. This is a ritual where the deities are worshipped and are approached for help and relief of sufferings. Whenever the Jenu Kurumba experiences serious difficulties they can go to the shrines of their deities. These are small straw-thatched clay huts in the centre of which the deities are represented by stone or metal images (*mokka*, lit. face). If people want to approach the deities for relief and help they have to communicate with them. In the discursive arena of the *pu:ja*, then, two parties are engaged, namely the Jenu Kurumba on the one side and the deities on the other.

The rhetoric discourse with the deities is initiated by the priests of the shrines who first have to invite the deity to come and, for the time being, take its seat in the image. This invitation is made in the form of an offering consisting of coconuts, camphor, bananas, betel leaves and incense sticks, the smell of which is able to, as the Jenu Kurumba say, attract the deities and to make them come. These offerings are accompanied by the priests verbal address. They act as advocates for the petitioners and, depending on the urgency of the problem, design a longer or shorter, a dramatic or an ordinary speech. They introduce the people as the 'children of the deity' and address the deities with close kinship terms like mother or grandfather. Thus taken into responsibility they request the deities to acknowledge the offerings that 'the children' gave, to listen to their difficulties, to look after them and so forth.

After those persuading speeches of the priests the petitioners themselves voice their problems. They also talk directly to the deity and usually

the priests don't interfere. They may sometimes do so, however, in particular if they are closely related to the worshipper and are thus also afflicted by the sufferings. As the priests did, they too addressed the deities in terms of kinship but they depict their sufferings and problems in a more elaborated and dramatized way. They also narrate parts of their recent social history with the deities, pointing out how much offerings they gave and, most important, how often they were talking well of the deities, thus contributing to the growth of their good name and of their reputation. To enforce the persuasive power of their speeches they finally remind the deities of their earlier promises of support and hold the present sufferings against that, thus suggesting that the deities mistreated them and might not deserve the good name that the living helped to establish.

In contrast to the healing and death rituals the deities response is not a verbal reply. Instead they answer to the requests with a particular form of symbolic behaviour. Before the offerings are given the *pu:ja* actually begins with the priest washing and dressing the deity's image. Finally they adorn the deity with a garland of flowers around its neck. Now, at the end of the speeches the deity responds symbolically to its children by letting a flower fall down from the image. If it falls down at the right side this is seen as a positive reply and interpreted as the willingness of the deity to help. If it falls down on the left side it is a negative answer indicating that the deity is unwilling to support its children's requests.

Yet, direct verbal response can be obtained, though not in the *pu:ja*, but in the other performances. In the healing ritual, for example, people not only discuss the patient's immediate problems but also the social history of the patient's social network at large is under scrutiny. Thus it happens that in the dialogues with the deities the relatives of the patient bring in their own matters. If the deity had promised its support in the *pu:ja*, but still the suffering continues, they may ask what happened. In death rituals too the deities might be invited to embody themselves in the shamans and there they also can be approached for response. In both context the deities are indeed taken to task and are confronted with their responsibilities.

### ***Persuasive Strategies***

In ritual, as we have seen, the participants have to achieve complex transformations. Most important, illness and death put the morality and relatedness of people into question, they lead to mistrust and a crisis of social relations. In ritual, in turn, the actors have to transform their bad relations, they have to *move* one another towards reconciliation and trust. In short, transformation is accomplished rhetorically. In ritual discourse manifold persuasive strategies are employed to achieve that goal. Among them, are well known techniques like repetition, parallelism or focusation. In what follows, however, we want to outline some of the less explored devices, namely

narratives, social memory, emotions and, last but not least, symbolic action or, as Fernandez (1985) has called it, the 'performance of images.'

One of the important strategies in ritual rhetoric is narrativity. Following Taylor (1989), narrativity can be defined as a stretch of discourse that implies a most basic temporal structure of the type '...and...then...'. Its structure can be impersonal in the sense that the speakers just describe events or facts. Sherzer (1982), for instance, argues for the persuasive function of this type of narrative in the healing rituals of the Kuna. In other speech events, narratives are rather personal and, as Bauman (1986) and Hill (1995) make clear, are used rhetorically too. This is particularly the case when social or moral conflicts are at issue. In Jenu Kurumba rituals all speakers make use of that device, because with it speakers ascribe a person's position in time as well as in social space. In the beginning of the discourses the shamans employ it to put the 'face' and the reliability of the living in question. They construct the social biography of people as a narrative of mistakes and failures. The living, in turn, likewise use narratives to argue against the reproaches of the shamans. In order to regain a positive moral face, confidence and reliability, they articulate their own, positive narratives. The living remind the shamans of their good behaviour in the past, thus reconstructing their history as a positive 'story.'

Social memory and forgetting also play an important role because they allow construction of the moral person, that is a person with a history of bad and good relationships. This is the case in contexts of everyday life (Taylor *ibid.*) but also in ritual performances (Connerton 1989, Csordas 1996). In Jenu Kurumba rituals, however, memories are contested as much as narratives. The living claim that their own positive memories are more appropriate representations than those of the shamans (*resp.* deities or the dead). Therefore, they ask the latter to accept their memories as legitimate representations of the past. Based on these narrative arguments they demand that the shamans should not take their own memories into account but rather forget the negative memories. In ritual discourse, memories thus function as arguments.

The third important rhetorical tool is the emotions of the interlocutors. M. Rosaldo (1980) argued early on that feelings are often a kind of pragmatic language. This is in particular the case, when interpersonal and moral issues are at stake. Further research has shown that this often implies a rhetorical function. Kleinman (1992) and DelVecchio Good *et al.* (1992) for example point out that experiences like social suffering and pain are powerful persuasive means. Emotions, they write, have an 'important rhetorical dimension: they are meant to arouse a response in audiences, as well as express discomfort' (DelVecchio Good *et al.* 1992: 201). Moreover, in contexts where moral identities are negotiated, emotions are, as Lutz and White say, 'a primary idiom for defining and negotiating social relations of the self in a moral order' (1986:

417). This is the case in Jenu Kurumba ritual discourse too. As the dialogues show expressions of feelings are often used as moral arguments with a rhetorical force. The shamans frequently articulate the sufferings of the dead or the anger of deities to provoke appropriate responses; in the death ritual, for example, they foreground their loneliness (*bejaru*), their missing strength (*ba:la*) and their lost memories (*neppu ka:ne*). All this is said to persuade the living to help and support. In the healings rituals the deities express their anger and disappointment, but here too a rhetorical effect is achieved, namely to persuade the living to make a commitment to the ethical standards of the community.

The living, too, use their feelings to move the deities and dead towards support, co-operation and ultimately reconciliation. They frequently express their own suffering. They often point out their distress and bemoan their moral weakness as well as their ignorance of the 'right path' the 'correct way of behaving.' The ritual performances make clear that usually the other-than-human beings can't resist giving appropriate replies to the feelings of their human relatives. The dead cooperate in the death ritual and in the healing rituals the deities most often agree to help their living relatives. In addition, at the end of most dialogues speakers persuade one another that they really have no anger and that the ritual has achieved its principal aim, the resurrection, as it were, of social harmony, trust and happiness.

Another most important rhetorical tool is the performance of symbolic action. As Fernandez (1985, 1986) has shown ritual actors not only employ words but also symbolic actions or 'images' as arguments. This is most clearly the case in the death ritual where the encompassing good community is not only imagined in verbal images but also through ritual action. In the *pole* the actors gradually develop an allegory of the community and in particular the metaphor of a cooperative household where all members take care of each other. This is on the one hand accomplished through speech and its poiesis (see below) but also by performing symbolic actions. Assisted by the dead person, which is embodied in a shaman, the living first bring green branches from a tree to the prepared ritual place. In a second scene they ceremoniously bring water from a river to the ritual place and, finally, after others brought foodstuff and firewood, all participants build a small leaf hut, in which later the dead and also the ancestors are invited to take a seat in two water filled clay pots. Once this is accomplished the dead will be served food and entertained at night with music and dance. The following day the spirit and the ancestors are united and helped to reach the underworld. This is achieved through pouring the water from both pots on the root of a tree in the forest.

These deeds, however, are not simply an enactment of symbolic meaning, but they are employed as arguments to back the verbal claims that are made in the debates. In particular, they are employed to convince the dead that the living relatives really cooperate and help them. The living, in

fact, use these symbolic acts to prove that the verbal claims which they made are really true; that they do what they say and that they 'do good'. This is also made explicit in the verbal discourse, where the living demand that the shamans (resp. the dead) reflexively recognize their deeds and accept them as evidence of their good conduct and relationship.

The same holds true for the other rituals as well. In the healing rituals the living not only debate with the shamans but they also make offerings of fruits, incense and tobacco. As an analysis of the texts disclose these acts are reflexively pointed out by the living as giving evidence of their proper moral conduct. They are thus important tools to persuade the deities to help the living. Finally, in the discourse of the *puja* too symbolic action is employed as a kind of argument since the whole procedure of dressing the deities' images, giving offerings and burning incense and camphor, so that the deities 'enjoy the smell and come,' as the Jenu Kurumba say, is explicitly meant to persuade the deities to embody the image and to help.

In sum, all these strategies show that rhetorical transformation is brought about on a dialogic level of performance. In the beginning, the morality of the speakers and their good social relationship is put into question. But in the ritual process the actors seek to defend their reputation as good members of the community and try to persuade one another that the reproaches and suspicions are unfounded. Yet it is crucial to see that this is not a matter of mere representation and 'make-believe'. Instead narratives and memories, for example, are always subject to evaluation and criticism. Speakers use these devices as arguments to position themselves and others in the moral space of the community. Yet, in doing so they are also provoking response and debate, so that all speakers are engaged in the evaluation, rejection, approval or even in forgetting - and thus in the reworking of representations.

Indeed, the transformative process of ritual is based on this selective process. Positive memories, narratives and emotions of the person are accepted as justified. Once approved, they are counted as good arguments and as appropriate representations of the person in question. In addition, reports of the good deeds in the ritual itself legitimate the forgetting of the bad memories. It is only in that process of rejecting and approving the remembered and emotional episodes of their social history that the participants gradually succeed to create a larger, more positive and convincing story, a social biography of their good social relation. Ultimately, however, it is the symbolic deeds that are regarded as the most convincing arguments. With these deeds speakers do validate and legitimise their verbal claims. Through their deeds they demonstrate that they do what they say so that symbolic action is indeed regarded as the most powerful persuasive tool. With them, participants most often succeed in finally moving one another from crisis and mistrust to reconciliation, support and the good community.

### **Culture, a 'two-sided' poetical resource**

We have argued above that culture is not only a rhetorical achievement on the level of person-to-person relations, that is in social practice, but also on the level of person-worldview relations. In other words people need not only negotiate their relationships but also choose which perspectives, meanings and arguments they use in the process. For this to happen, a pool of meanings, arguments, etc. must be available to them. Moreover, that resource does not provide preformed meanings but it offers elements from which actors/speakers can construct their positions. Finally, because in response to the same question at least two opposing answers are possible, it follows that we are dealing with 'two-sided' and dilemmatic resources from which the agents must choose if they want to act appropriately in social life.

Empirically this is clearly the case among the Jenu Kurumba. Vital parts of their cultural resources are organized as a set of poetically formed and opposing notions of how life should be and how it should not be, what is bad and what is good. This pool of meanings is explicitly used and made public in the ritual performances described above. The proper community is always depicted in terms of caring, solidarity and protection. Moreover, and not surprisingly for gatherer/hunters, the good community is described with metaphors of forest life. Thus it is imagined as a 'pleasant and protected camp in the forest' and as the 'cool location,' the 'shady spot' in the forest or it is likened to the 'calm and peaceful camp under trees that offer shade.' Another picture describes the community as a nest of birds in which humans help each other, like 'eggs in the nest mutually support one another and prevent one tipping over' or like 'birds in the nest who, though they occasionally fight, don't throw one another out.' The shamans are depicted, because of the help they render in the rituals, as the trees that offer their shade or as trees that provide the camping peoples with a backrest (they can lean their back against). The root of the tree serves as a metaphor for the safe foundation of a joint and peaceful community.

Other images make clear that a good community not only comprehends human beings but also the deities and the dead. All are moral beings in a shared social world. We often hear of how the living persons present themselves as 'the children of the deities' or of the priests addressed as the 'favourite children' of the deities sitting in their lap and being taken care of nicely. In turn the deities are imagined as parents who hold the human beings 'like children by their hand' take them 'like infants in their lap' or 'rock them to sleep' like children. In other passages the dead are likened to parent birds, who protect and take care of their male and female children even though the children will always fight and behave badly.

This poetic imaginary is further enriched through the meanings of symbolic action. We have pointed out already that ritual actors not only use words but also the performance of tropes to imagine their world. This is most

explicit in the death ritual where the encompassing good community is actually instantiated in the series of symbolic acts and where a powerful allegory of the community as a cooperative household is achieved. With the gradual performance of these scenes the death ritual can indeed be seen as an allegory of the good, protective and care taking community. In ritual it becomes alive, performed and visualized.

It must be underlined, though, that the above images are not simply presented as an unquestioned concept of the moral community but rather emerge as rhetorical devices to back arguments and positions. In the same way, however, also negative images and tropes are brought forward. Again and again people argue against concepts of sociality which they don't want and which they think are not appropriate images for a good social life. Though these counter images are used in all rituals discourses they are particularly pronounced in the healing rituals.

Thus social life is depicted as a path (*da:ri*) or a way of life on which people move suffering (*pa:du*) and endangered. On this sorrowful path the failure of humans falls down on them like 'a rock' and human beings are depicted as 'human worms' that are innocent and helpless. They are overwhelmed by their social wrong doings like 'a tree is overwhelmed by blooms in spring.' Moreover, social life is not only sorrowful but also vitally dangerous. Humans are exposed to the misdeeds (*karma*) of others, they are crushed by others' magic that is hiding and waiting for them 'at holes at the wayside' and so forth.

Accordingly, we also find the image of social life as a forest camp, this time however it is conceived as an endangered place imagined as a hot, unprotected and hostile camp. Around it the deities should built a fence in order to protect the human beings and we also hear of the bad community as a place without 'trees that offer protection' and without 'cooling shade,' that is without peace. In other arguments this bad community is depicted as a 'desert-like location,' dried up by the 'fire' of human-made diseases, i.e. magic, and fighting. In it people continuously quarrel and hurt one another. Accordingly one can hear the wounded crying and the sufferers lamenting. In such a bad community, it is said, people weep and beat their chest because of their sorrow and worriedness regarding the relatives who become sick, weak or who die due to the mistakes and misbehaviour of others. But humans are not always intentionally bad. As the discourses reveal, the Jenu Kurumba also see them as existentially weak and fallible. Often they use the term 'human worms' (*nare ullu*) to denote human beings and underline with that inferior condition of humans in relation to, for example, the deities and deceased. Other expressions liken them to children who are innocent, like very small babies they are said to be blind and weak. This idea is also sometimes used to point out the humans existential need of the deities' support and guidance. Without it, it is said, the 'human worms' inevitably miss their way, hurt one another and suffer.

Finally, while the death ritual is clearly an allegory of the good community the performance of the healing ritual enacts a master image of a bad social life. As the performance unfolds it gradually combines a set of poetically constructed images into an allegory of the immoral community. In the course of the seance the shamans descend into the underworld several times to search for helpful deities, to bring them up for a talk with their human relatives and to finally help them. Yet, instead of getting assistance, the shamans very often come across deities that are indifferent to the suffering and pain of the living. If they find concerned deities, these confront them with the mistakes and the bad life way of the humans, thus justifying or indicating their unwillingness to help those 'misbehaving human worms'. Moreover, if they are successful in persuading the deities to talk, these often simply disappear after a while, thus making the deities' support unpredictable. This dramatization of the performance underlines the endangered and miserable condition of the allegorical 'bad community.'

In sum, then, the poetics and performance of Jenu Kurumba ritual discourse discloses tropes that constitute a vital part of their culture. Speakers and performers can draw upon this poetical resource to justify or deny claims, to articulate or refute arguments and to work towards reconciliation and a good community. It is most important to note that this is not a uniform and unchallenged reservoir but a two-sided 'tool box,' so to say, that enables people to shape their pro- and contra arguments and positions in discourse. Ultimately, the ritual discourse also reveals that the Jenu Kurumba themselves conceptualise their community as a tradition of persuasion which is *per se* dilemmatic and therefore demands continuous rhetorical specification. On the one hand, people are in need of moral orientation and accordingly have to make appropriate linkages with the moral resources and standards. On the other hand, however, human beings are intentionally bad or they simply fail and go wrong. In both cases social life is, due to the weakness and fallibility of the 'human worms,' inevitable fragile and unpredictable.

Yet, the Jenu Kurumba also point out the ways this dilemma can be solved, at least temporarily. In many instances of discourse speakers make it explicit that the foundation of the good community is debate and argumentation. Thus, many of the most often used verbal expressions are related to the performance of discourse and argumentation itself: 'speak out,' 'ask,' 'listen,' 'tell which way we should go,' 'tell the account,' 'brake up and narrate' and so forth are all phrases that initiate and keep the ritual debate going. For the Jenu Kurumba ongoing participation in the 'speeches on good and bad' and engagement in ritual discourse and debate is the key. Without it there is no justice, no allocation of responsibility, no moral orientation for the correct way of life etc.. In short, without debate there can be no foundation (*nele*) for the moral community.

## Conclusion

The present chapter argued that 'culture' can be seen as rhetorically constituted throughout and the Jenu Kurumba provided rich material to illustrate that. Because joint moral life is inherently dilemmatic, i. e. marked by a plurality of positions on the one side and at the same time constrained by the need to construct a 'common ground' (without which a culture cannot exist either) members of a culture are continuously required to argue out their relationships and their positions in the moral space of the community. Accordingly, while rhetoric is often understood in terms of monologic and epideictic discourse, it is a dialogic, interactive and 'Sophistic' approach that is most relevant for rhetorical theory of culture. As Vickers has noted Sophists saw rhetoric as 'a process of interaction in which the norms of justice and social order were worked out by those taking part' (1998: 123). This concept regards people's 'direct involvement with community decisions' (op. cit.: 6) as vital, so that Cicero, for example, could hold that rhetoric is designed to make people aware 'that they must work for the common good' (op. cit.: 8). For the Sophists rhetoric meant indeed an 'improvement of society through "expression of conflict and yet contain it by an agreed political procedure"' (op. cit.: 124). In other words, a persuasive model of culture sees rhetoric as a mutual process of argumentation the effectiveness of which derives from a two sided-process, with the development of pro- and contra-statements, with negotiation and the change of perspectives achieved (or not achieved).

In seeing rhetoric as a dialogic process of mutual argumentation we are able to empirically investigate how people not only negotiate moral relationships but also how they transform them and how they achieve agreement or consensus – in short how they create a 'common ground' without which no culture can exist. Culture, therefore, is rhetorically constituted on two levels, namely in social practice and interaction where social relations and moral positions are at issue and, on the other hand, with respect to the pool of meanings and, symbols and themes speakers/actors can draw upon in the process.

Among the Jenu Kurumba the former person-to-person level of rhetorical praxis unfolds in ritual performances which serve as the arenas where people move one another with good arguments from moral crisis towards reconciliation, consensus and trust. The performances as a whole constitute a tradition of argumentation, where the alternating articulation of memories, narratives and feelings enable the speakers to transform their social relations and thus to regain the 'common ground' of a good community. The study of those processes lays bare the second level of a rhetoric tradition, the two-sided pool of meanings and topics speakers can draw upon in practice. For the Jenu Kurumba this entails in particular moral concepts and ideas of what a good joint life is and isn't like. Culture on that level, then, is a two-sided resource not providing unchallenged blue-prints but only themes, topics and

propositions that can be used by people to shape an argument and to define a position in debate or social space. Moreover, this resource does not fully exist in a timeless realm of 'culture' but is constructed and reconstructed in actual settings of discourse. This also implies that this level of culture is open to modification, enrichment and loss. New topics can enter that pool, fresh or borrowed ideas and notion can be taken in while others, if they turn out to be inappropriate, will cease to be used and even may disappear. Always, however, it's existence as a common ground depends on the mutual consent that people reach in the process of argumentation. Understood that way, 'culture' can indeed be conceived as a living tradition where people 'continually argue with each other over who or what they are' (Shotter *ibid.*: 200).

#### NOTE

1. The Jenu Kurumba are not the only gatherer-hunter and forest trader community in South India conducting shamanic performances that include elaborate verbal discourses on morality and ethics. The Paliyar (Gardner 1991) and Mala Pandaram (Morris 1981) seem to have similar rituals.

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